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Abstract. We study first-order concatenation theory with bounded quan-
tifiers. We give axiomatizations with interesting properties, and we prove
some normal-form results. Finally, we prove a number of decidability and
undecidability results.
1 Introduction
1.1 Concatenation Theory vs. Number Theory
First-order concatenation theory can be compared to first-order number theory,
e.g., Peano Arithmetic or Robinson Arithmetic. The universe of a standard struc-
ture for first-order number theory is the set of natural numbers. The universe of a
standard structure for first-order concatenation theory is the set of finite strings
over some alphabet. A first-order language for number theory normally contains
two binary functions symbols. In a standard structure these symbols will be
interpreted as addition and multiplication. A first-order language for concate-
nation theory normally contains just one binary function symbol. In a standard
structure this symbol will be interpreted as the operator that concatenates two
stings. A classical first-order language for concatenation theory—like e.g. the
ones studied in Quine [19] and Grzegorczyk [5]—contains no other non-logical
symbols apart from constant symbols.
We will stick to a version of concatenation theory where we have a binary al-
phabet consisting of the bits zero and one, and we will refer to this version as
bit theory. It is convenient to introduce and explain some notation before we
continue our discussion.
1.2 Notation and Terminology
We will use 0 and 1 to denote respectively the bits zero and one, and we use
pretty standard notation when we work with bit strings: {0,1}∗ denotes the set
of all finite bit strings; |α| denotes the length of the bit string α; (α)i denotes
the ith bit of the bit string α; and 013021 denotes the bit string 0111001. The
set {0,1}∗ contains the empty string which we will denote ε.
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The language L−BT of first-order bit theory consists of the constants symbols
e, 0, 1 and the binary function symbol ◦. We will use B− to denote the standard
L−BT -structure: The universe of B
− is the set {0,1}∗. The constant symbol 0
is interpreted as the string containing nothing but the bit 0, and the constant
symbol 1 is interpreted as the string containing nothing but the bit 1, that is,
0B
−
= 0 and 1B
−
= 1. The constant symbol e is interpreted as the empty string,
that is, eB
−
= ε. Finally, ◦B
−
is the function that concatenates two strings (e.g.
01 ◦B
−
000 = 01000 and ε ◦B
−
ε = ε).
We will soon need the biterals. For each α ∈ {0,1}∗ we define the biteral α by
ε = e, α0 = α ◦ 0 and α1 = α ◦ 1. The biterals correspond to the numerals of
first-order number theory: they serve as canonical names for the elements in the
universe of the standard structure. Note that, e.g., ((e ◦ 1) ◦ 1) ◦ 0 is a biteral
whereas (e ◦ 1) ◦ (1 ◦ 0) is not.
1.3 Decidability and Undecidability
At a first glance the parsimonious language of first-order bit theory does not
seem very expressive, but a little bit of thought shows otherwise. Observe that
we can encode a sequence a1, a2, . . . , an of natural numbers by a the bit string
00101a1+1001101a2+1001301a3+100 . . .001n01an+100 .
Furthermore, we can state that a string is a substring of another (the formula
(∃uv)[u ◦ x ◦ v = y] holds in B− iff x is a substring of y). We can state that
a string contain only ones (the formula ¬(∃uv)[u ◦ 0 ◦ v = x] holds in B− iff x
contains only ones, and so does the the formula x ◦ 1 = 1 ◦x). We can state that
a bit string does not contain two consecutive occurrences of zeros, and so on. If
we proceed along these lines, we can come up with a formula φ(x, y, z) such that
φ(1i,1a, α) is true in B iff α encodes a sequence of natural numbers where the
ith element is a. The reader interested in the details should consult Section 8 of
Leary & Kristiansen [15].
First-order bit theory is indeed expressive enough to code and decode sequences
of natural numbers, and then it should be no surprise that the following theorem
holds. E.g., it is straightforward to prove the theorem by induction over a Kleene-
recursive definition of f .
Theorem 1 (Definability of Computable Functions). For any (partially)
computable function f : Nn → N there exists an L−BT -formula φ(x1, . . . , xn, y)
such that
f(a1, . . . , an) = b ⇔ B
− |= φ(1a1 , . . . ,1an ,1b) .
Moreover, given a definition of the function, we can compute the formula.
This theorem implies that it is undecidable if a L−BT -sentence is true in the
standard structureB−. It is of course also undecidable if a sentence of first-order
First-Order Concatenation Theory with Bounded Quantifiers 3
number theory is true in its standard structure N. Indeed, due to the negative
solution of Hilbert’s 10th problem (the Davis-Putnam-Robinson-Matiyasevich
Theorem), it is even undecidable if a sentence of the form
∃x1, . . . , xn[ s = t ]
is true in N. The bit-theoretic version of Hilbert’s 10th problem turned out to
have a positive solution. The next theorem is just a reformulation of a result of
Makanin [16].
Theorem 2 (Makanin). It is decidable if an L−BT -sentence of the form
∃x1, . . . , xn[ s = t ]
is true in B−.
Hence, it is in general undecidable if a sentence is true in B−, but it is decidable
if a sentence of the form ∃x1, . . . xn[s = t] is true inB
−. This raises the question:
where do we find the border between the decidable and the undecidable? For
which subclasses of formulas can we, or can we not, decide truth in the standard
structure? Such a question yields an obvious motivation for introducing bounded
quantifiers similar to those we know from number theory. Once the bounded
quantifiers are there, a number of other questions will knock at the door.
1.4 Bounded Quantifiers and Σ-formulas
The first-order language LBT is L
−
BT extended by a binary relation symbol ⊑.
We introduce the bounded existential quantifier (∃x ⊑ t)φ and bounded universal
quantifier (∀x ⊑ t)φ as shorthand notations for respectively
∃x[ x ⊑ t ∧ φ ] and ∀x[ x ⊑ t → φ ] .
Next we define the Σ-formulas inductively by
– φ and ¬φ are Σ-formulas if φ is of the form s ⊑ t, or of the form s = t,
where s and t are terms
– (φ ∨ ψ) and (φ ∧ ψ) are Σ-formulas if φ and ψ are Σ-formulas
– (∃x ⊑ t)φ and (∀x ⊑ t)φ and (∃x)φ are Σ-formulas if φ is a Σ-formula, t is
a term and x is a variable not occurring in t.
A purely existential formula is a Σ-formula that does not contain bounded uni-
versal quantifiers.
We assume that the reader notes the similarities with first-order number the-
ory. The formulas that correspond to Σ-formulas in number theory are often
called Σ1-formulas or Σ
0
1 -formulas. Now, in contrast to in number theory, it is
not clear how the relation symbol that defines the bounded quantifiers should
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be interpreted. In the standard model for number theory the relation symbol
should obviously be interpreted as the standard ordering relation of the natural
numbers. There does not seem to be any other natural options. We can chose
between the less-than or less-than-or-equal-to relation over the natural numbers,
and that is it. In bit theory a number of essentially different interpretations will
make sense. We might interpret x ⊑ y as
– x is a substring y
– x is a prefix of y
– x is shorter than y.
The three interpretations listed above are the ones that will be investigated in
the current paper, but there are definitely other interesting options. We might
e.g. interpret ⊑ as the subword relation investigated in Halfon et. al. [8], or as a
lexicographical ordering relation.
1.5 More on Notation and Terminology
We reserve the letter B for the structure where ⊑ is the substring relation, that
is, the LBT -structure B is the extension of B
− where α ⊑B β holds iff there
exists γ, δ ∈ {0,1}∗ such that γαδ = β.
The LBT -structure D is the same structure asB with one exception: the relation
α ⊑D β holds iff α is a prefix of β, that is, iff there exists γ ∈ {0,1}∗ such that
αγ = β.
The LBT -structure F is the same structure as B with one exception: the relation
α ⊑F β holds iff the number of bits in α is less than or equal to the number of
bits in β, that is, iff |α| ≤ |β|.
To improve the readability we will use the symbol  in place of the symbol ⊑
in formulas that are meant to be interpreted in the structure D. Thus, x  y
should be read as “x is a prefix of y”. Similarly, we will use E in formulas that
are meant to be interpreted in F, and x E y should be read as “x is shorter
than y”. We will continue to use the symbol ⊑ in formulas that are meant to be
interpreted in B. Thus, x ⊑ y should be read as “x is a substring of y”.
We may skip the operator ◦ in first-order formulas and simply write st in place
of s ◦ t. Furthermore, we will occasionally contract quantifiers and write, e.g.,
∀xy ⊑ z[φ] in place of (∀x ⊑ z)(∀y ⊑ z)φ, and for ∼∈ {,⊑,E,=}, we will
normally write s 6∼ t in place of ¬s ∼ t.
Recall that a sentence is a formula with no free variables.
1.6 References and Related Research
Formal concatenation theory can be traced back to Tarski [23] and Hermes [9]
(see [20] for an English review). Quine [19] and Corcoran et al. [2] are also papers
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on the subject that may have some historical interest. A rather recent line of
research in concatenation theory has focused on interpretablity between weak
first-order theories and essential undecidability. Grzegorczyk [5], Grzegorczyk &
Zdanowski [6], Svejdar [22], Visser [24], Horihata [11] and Higuchi & Horihata
[10] belong to this line. Another recent line of research has focused on word
equations and formal languages. Papers in this line, like e.g., Karhuma¨ki et al.
[12], Ganesh et al. [4], Halfon et al. [8] and Day et al. [3], are in general oriented
towards theoretical computer science. Both lines are related to our research: the
former to the first-order theories we present in Section 2, the latter to the results
we present in last two sections of the paper. More on the history of concatenation
theory can be found in Visser [24].
The present paper is a significantly extended an improved version of the con-
ference paper Kristiansen & Murwanashyaka [13]. We assume that the reader
is familiar with the basics of mathematical logic and computability theory. An
introduction can be found Leary & Kristiansen [15] (Chapter 8 contains some
material on concatenation theory). Some familiarity with first-order arithmetic
will probably also be beneficial to the reader. An introduction can be found in
Hajek & Pudlak [7].
2 Σ-Complete Axiomatizations
Once the bounded quantifiers are present, it is natural to ask if we can find
neat and natural Σ-complete axiomatisations of bit theory. Corresponding ax-
iomatizations of number theory, e.g. Robinson Arithmetic, have been of great
importance in logic. In this section we will give finite sets of axioms that are
Σ-complete with respect to our different structures (B, D and F). These ax-
iomatizations might serve as base theories which can be extended with, e.g.,
collection principles or induction schemes of the form
(
φ(e) ∧ ∀x[ φ(x)→ (φ(x0) ∧ φ(x1)) ]
)
→ ∀x[φ(x)] .
2.1 The Theory B−
B− is a L−BT -theory. All the first-order theories we will present contain the
axioms of B−.
Definition 3. The first-order theory B− contains the following four non-logical
axioms:
1. ∀x[ x = ex ∧ x = xe ]
2. ∀xyz[ (xy)z = x(yz) ]
3. ∀xy[ (x 6= y)→ ( (x0 6= y0) ∧ (x1 6= y1) ) ]
4. ∀xy[ x0 6= y1 ]
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We will use B−i to refer to the i
th axiom of B−.
Lemma 4. Let α, β ∈ {0,1}∗. Then B− ⊢ α ◦ β = αβ.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the length of β, and we consider
the following cases: β ≡ ε, β ≡ γ0 and β ≡ γ1.
Assume β ≡ ε. Then β ≡ e, and the lemma holds by the axiom B−1 . Assume
β ≡ γ0. By the induction hypothesis, we have B− ⊢ α ◦ γ = αγ. Thus, we also
have
B− ⊢ (α ◦ γ) ◦ 0 = αγ ◦ 0 .
By B−2 , we have
B− ⊢ α ◦ (γ ◦ 0) = αγ ◦ 0 .
Thus, the lemma holds as β ≡ γ ◦ 0 and αβ ≡ αγ0 ≡ αγ ◦ 0. The case β ≡ γ1
is similar. ⊓⊔
Lemma 5. For any LBT -term t there is α ∈ {0,1}
∗ such that B− ⊢ t = α.
Proof. We will use induction on the structure of t. Assume t ≡ e. Obviously,
B− ⊢ e = e. Thus, we have B− ⊢ e = ε as ε ≡ e. Assume t ≡ 0. By B−1 , we have
B− ⊢ 0 = e ◦ 0. Thus, we have B− ⊢ 0 = 0 as 0 = e ◦ 0. The case t ≡ 1 is similar
to the case t ≡ 0. Finally, assume t ≡ t1 ◦ t2. By induction hypothesis we have
α1, α2 ∈ {0,1}
∗ such that B− ⊢ t1 = α1 and B
− ⊢ t2 = α2. By Lemma 4, we
have B− ⊢ α1 ◦ α2 = α1α2. Thus, B
− ⊢ t = α1α2. ⊓⊔
Lemma 6. B−1 , B
−
2 , B
−
4 ⊢ ∀x[ x0 6= e ∧ x1 6= e ].
Proof. We reason in an arbitrary model for {B−1 , B
−
2 , B
−
4 }. Let x be an arbitrary
element in the universe. Assume x0 = e. Then 1(x0) = 1e. By B−1 , we have
1(x0) = 1. By B−2 , we have (1x)0 = 1. By B
−
1 , we have (1x)0 = e1. This
contradicts B−4 . This proves that x0 6= e. A symmetric argument shows that
x1 6= e. ⊓⊔
Lemma 7. Let α, β ∈ {0,1}∗ and α 6= β. Then B− ⊢ α 6= β.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the natural number min(|α|, |β|).
Assume min(|α|, |β|) = 0. Then, either α or β will be the empty string ε. Fur-
thermore, it cannot be the case that both α or β are the empty string as α 6= β.
By Lemma 6, we have B− ⊢ α 6= β.
Assume min(|α|, |β|) > 0. Then we have α ≡ α′a and β ≡ β′b where α, β ∈
{0,1}∗ and a, b ∈ {0,1}. The proof splits into two cases: (i) a and b are equal, and
(ii) a and b are different. Case (i): The induction hypothesis yields B− ⊢ α′ 6= β′,
and the lemma follows by B−3 . Case (ii): The lemma follows straightaway by B
−
4
(we do not need the induction hypothesis). ⊓⊔
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We leave the proof of the next theorem to the reader (see the proof of Theorem
13).
Theorem 8. For any purely existential sentence φ, we have
B− |= φ ⇒ B− ⊢ φ .
2.2 The Structure B
Definition 9. The first-order theory B contains the following eleven non-logical
axioms:
- the first four axioms are the axioms of B−
5. ∀x[ x ⊑ e↔ x = e ]
6. ∀x[ x ⊑ 0↔ (x = e ∨ x = 0) ]
7. ∀x[ x ⊑ 1↔ (x = e ∨ x = 1) ]
8. ∀xy[ x ⊑ 0y0↔ (x = 0y0 ∨ x ⊑ 0y ∨ x ⊑ y0) ]
9. ∀xy[ x ⊑ 0y1↔ (x = 0y1 ∨ x ⊑ 0y ∨ x ⊑ y1) ]
10. ∀xy[ x ⊑ 1y0↔ (x = 1y0 ∨ x ⊑ 1y ∨ x ⊑ y0) ]
11. ∀xy[ x ⊑ 1y1↔ (x = 1y1 ∨ x ⊑ 1y ∨ x ⊑ y1) ]
We will use Bi to refer to the i
th axiom of B.
Lemma 10. Let α, β ∈ {0,1}∗ and α ⊑B β (i.e. α is a substring of β). Then
B ⊢ α ⊑ β.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the length of β. The proof splits
into the cases β ≡ ε, β ≡ 0, β ≡ 1, β ≡ 0γ0, β ≡ 0γ1, β ≡ 1γ0 and β ≡ 1γ1.
In the cases when β is empty or just contains a single bit, the lemma holds by
B5, B6 or B7.
Assume β ≡ 0γ0. The proof splits into the cases
(i) α = 0γ0, (ii) α ⊑B 0γ and (iii) α ⊑B γ0.
In case (i), we have B ⊢ α = β by logical axioms. By B8, we have B ⊢ α ⊑ β. In
case (ii), the induction hypothesis yields B ⊢ α ⊑ 0γ. By B8, we have B ⊢ α ⊑ β.
In case (iii), the induction hypothesis yields B ⊢ α ⊑ γ0. By B8, we have
B ⊢ α ⊑ β.
The cases β ≡ 0γ1, β ≡ 1γ0 and β ≡ 1γ1 are similar to the case β ≡ 0γ0, use
B9, B10 and B11, respectively, in place of B8. ⊓⊔
Lemma 11. Let α, β ∈ {0,1}∗ and α 6⊑B β (i.e. α is a not substring of β).
Then B ⊢ α 6⊑ β.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is symmetric to the proof of Lemma 10, and we
omit the details. ⊓⊔
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Lemma 12. Let φ(x) be an LBT -formula such that
B |= φ(α) ⇒ B ⊢ φ(α) (*)
for any α ∈ {0,1}∗. Then we have
B |= (∀x ⊑ α)φ(x) ⇒ B ⊢ (∀x ⊑ α)φ(x)
for any α ∈ {0,1}∗.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of α. We will consider the cases
α ≡ ε, α ≡ 0, α ≡ 1, α ≡ 0β0, α ≡ 0β1, α ≡ 1β0 and α ≡ 1β1.
Let α ≡ ε. Assume B |= (∀x ⊑ e)φ(x). Then B |= φ(e). By (*), we have
B ⊢ φ(e). By B5, we have B ⊢ (∀x ⊑ e)φ(x).
Let α ≡ 0. Assume B |= (∀x ⊑ 0)φ(x). Then B |= φ(ε) ∧ φ(0). By (*), we have
B ⊢ φ(ε) ∧ φ(0). By B6, we have B ⊢ (∀x ⊑ 0)φ(x). The case α ≡ 1 is similar
to the case α ≡ 0. Use B7 in place of B6.
Let α ≡ 0β0. Assume B |= (∀x ⊑ 0β0)φ(x). Then
B |= φ(0β0) ∧ (∀x ⊑ 0β)φ(x) ∧ (∀x ⊑ β0)φ(x) .
By (*) and the induction hypothesis, we have
B ⊢ φ(0β0) ∧ (∀x ⊑ 0β)φ(x) ∧ (∀x ⊑ β0)φ(x) .
By B8, we have B ⊢ (∀x ⊑ 0β0)φ(x).
The case α ≡ 0β1, the case α ≡ 1β0 and the case α ≡ 1β1 are handled similarly
using B9, B10 and B11, respectively, in place of B8. ⊓⊔
Theorem 13 (Σ-completeness of B). For any Σ-sentence φ, we have
B |= φ ⇒ B ⊢ φ .
Proof. We prove the theorem by induction on the structure of the Σ-sentence
φ. The base cases are φ ≡ s = t, φ ≡ s 6= t, φ ≡ s ⊑ t and φ ≡ s 6⊑ t (where s
and t are variable free). We attend to the case φ ≡ s ⊑ t. So assume φ ≡ s ⊑ t.
Furthermore, assume B |= s ⊑ t. By Lemma 5, we have α, β ∈ {0,1}∗ such that
B ⊢ s = α ∧ t = β . (*)
By the Soundness Theorem for first-order logic, we have α ⊑B β. By Lemma 10,
we have B ⊢ α ⊑ β. By (*), we have B ⊢ s ⊑ t. This proves that the theorem
holds when φ ≡ s ⊑ t. The cases φ ≡ s = t, φ ≡ s 6= t and φ ≡ s 6⊑ t are similar.
Use Lemma 7 in place of Lemma 10 when φ ≡ s 6= t. Use Lemma 11 in place of
Lemma 10 when φ ≡ s 6⊑ t.
We turn to the inductive cases. Let φ ≡ (ψ ∧ ξ). Assume B |= ψ ∧ ξ. Then we
have B |= ψ andB |= ξ. By the induction hypothesis, we have B ⊢ ψ and B ⊢ ξ.
Thus, B ⊢ ψ ∧ ξ. The case φ ≡ (ψ ∨ ξ) is similar.
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Let φ ≡ (∃x)ψ(x). Assume B |= (∃x)ψ(x). Then we have B |= ψ(α) for some
α ∈ {0,1}∗. Our induction hypothesis yields B ⊢ ψ(α), and then we also have
B ⊢ (∃x)ψ(x).
Let φ ≡ (∀x ⊑ t)ψ(x). Assume B |= (∀x ⊑ t)ψ(x). By Lemma 5, we have
β ∈ {0,1}∗ such that
B ⊢ t = β (†)
By the Soundness Theorem of first-order logic, we have
B |= (∀x ⊑ β)ψ(x) (‡)
Our induction hypothesis yields
B |= ψ(α) ⇒ B ⊢ ψ(α) (IH)
for all α ∈ {0,1}∗. By (IH), (‡) and Lemma 12, we have B ⊢ (∀x ⊑ β)ψ(x).
Finally, by (†), we have B ⊢ (∀x ⊑ t)ψ(x). This completes the case where φ is
of the form (∀x ⊑ t)ψ(x). We leave the case φ ≡ (∃x ⊑ t)ψ(x) to the reader. ⊓⊔
2.3 The Structure D
Definition 14. The first-order theory D contains the following seven non-logical
axioms:
- the first four axioms are the axioms of B−
5. ∀x[ x  e↔ x = e ]
6. ∀xy[ x  y0↔ (x = y0 ∨ x  y) ]
7. ∀xy[ x  y1↔ (x = y1 ∨ x  y) ]
We will use Di to refer to the i
th axiom of D.
Lemma 15. Let α, β ∈ {0,1}∗ and α D β (i.e. α is a prefix of β). Then
D ⊢ α  β.
Proof. This proof is symmetric to the proof of the next lemma. We omit the
details. ⊓⊔
Lemma 16. Let α, β ∈ {0,1}∗ and α 6D β (i.e. α is a not prefix of β). Then
D ⊢ α 6 β.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the length of β, and we consider
the cases β ≡ ε, β ≡ γ0 and β ≡ γ1.
Assume β is empty. Then α is not empty. By Lemma 7, we have D ⊢ α 6= e. By
axiom D5, we have D ⊢ α 6 e. Thus, D ⊢ α 6 β. Assume β ≡ γ0. Then we
have α 6= γ0 and α 6D γ. By our induction hypothesis, we have D ⊢ α 6 γ. By
Lemma 7, we have D ⊢ α 6= γ0. By axiom D6, we have D ⊢ α 6 γ0. The case
where β is of the form γ1 is similar. Apply axiom D7 in place of D6. ⊓⊔
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Lemma 17. Let φ(x) be an LBT -formula such that
D |= φ(α) ⇒ D ⊢ φ(α) (*)
for any α ∈ {0,1}∗. Then we have
D |= (∀x  α)φ(x) ⇒ D ⊢ (∀x  α)φ(x)
for any α ∈ {0,1}∗.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the length of α, and we consider
the cases α ≡ ε, α ≡ β0 and α ≡ β1.
Let α ≡ ε. Assume D |= (∀x  e)φ(x). Then we have D |= φ(e). By (*), we have
D ⊢ φ(e). By D5, we have D ⊢ (∀x  e)φ(x).
Let α ≡ β0. Assume D |= (∀x  β0)φ(x). Then we have D |= (∀x  β)φ(x) and
D |= φ(β0). By our induction hypothesis we have D ⊢ (∀x  β)φ(x). By (*), we
have D ⊢ φ(β0). By axiom D6 we have D ⊢ (∀x  β0)φ(x).
The case α ≡ β1 is similar to the preceding case. Use D7 in place of D6. ⊓⊔
Theorem 18 (Σ-completeness of D). For any Σ-sentence φ, we have
D |= φ ⇒ D ⊢ φ .
Proof. Given the lemmas above, we can more or less just repeat the proof of
Theorem 13. Use Lemma 15 in place of Lemma 10, Lemma 16 in place of Lemma
11 and Lemma 17 in place of Lemma 12. ⊓⊔
2.4 The Structure F
Definition 19. The first-order theory F contains the following eleven non-logical
axioms:
- the first four axioms are the axioms of B−
5. ∀x[ e E x ]
6. ∀x[ x E e→ x = e ]
7. ∀xy[ x0 E y0↔ x E y ]
8. ∀xy[ x0 E y1↔ x E y ]
9. ∀xy[ x1 E y0↔ x E y ]
10. ∀xy[ x1 E y1↔ x E y ].
11. ∀x[ x = e ∨ ∃y[ x = y0 ∨ x = y1 ] ].
We will use Fi to refer to the i
th axiom of F .
Lemma 20. Let α, β ∈ {0,1}∗ and α EF β (i.e. |α| ≤ |β|). Then F ⊢ α E β.
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Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the length of α, and we consider
the cases α ≡ ε, α ≡ α′0 and α ≡ α′1.
If α ≡ ε, we have F ⊢ α E β by F5. Let α ≡ α
′0. Since |α| ≤ |β|, we have
b ∈ {0,1} and β′ ∈ {0,1}∗ such that β = β′b. The induction hypothesis yields
F ⊢ α′ E β′. If b = 0, we have F ⊢ α E β by F7. If b = 1, we have F ⊢ α E β
by F8. This proves the case α ≡ α
′0. The proof when α ≡ α′1 is similar. Use F9
and F10, respectively, in place of F7 and F8. ⊓⊔
Lemma 21. Let α, β ∈ {0,1}∗ and α 6EF β (i.e. |α| > |β|). Then F ⊢ α 6E β.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the length of β, and we consider
the cases β ≡ ε, β ≡ β′0 and β ≡ β′1.
Assume β ≡ ε. Since |α| 6≤ |β|, we have α′ ∈ {0,1}∗ such that α = α′0 or
α = α′1. We can w.l.o.g. say that α = α′0. By Lemma 6, we have F ⊢ α 6= e.
By F6, we have F ⊢ α 6E β. Assume β ≡ β
′0. Since |α| 6≤ |β|, we have b ∈ {0,1}
and α′ ∈ {0,1}∗ such that α ≡ α′b. By our induction hypothesis, we have
F ⊢ α′ 6E β′. If b = 0, we have F ⊢ α 6E β by F7. If b = 1, we have F ⊢ α 6E β by
F9. The case β ≡ β
′1 is symmetric to the case β ≡ β′0. Use F8 in place of F7,
and use F10 in place of F9. ⊓⊔
It is convenient to introduce some new notation before we state our next lemma:
For any α ∈ {0,1}∗, let
[ε . . . α] = { β | β ∈ {0,1}∗ and β EF α} .
Lemma 22. We have
F ⊢ ∀x[ x E α →
∨
β∈[ε...α]
x = β ]
for any α ∈ {0,1}∗.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the length of α. The base case is
α ≡ ε. The inductive cases are α ≡ γ0 and α ≡ γ1.
First we deal with case α ≡ ε. The axiom F6 says that
∀x[ x E e→ x = e ] .
Thus, we have
F ⊢ ∀x[ x E α →
∨
β∈[ε...α]
x = β ]
straightaway as α is e, the set [ε . . . α] is the singleton set {ε} and ε is e.
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We will now turn to the inductive case α ≡ γ0. In this case it is sufficient to
prove
(1) F ⊢ ∀x[ x = e → ( x E γ0 →
∨
β∈[ε...γ0]
x = β ) ]
(2) F ⊢ ∀xy[ x = y0 → ( x E γ0 →
∨
β∈[ε...γ0]
x = β ) ]
(3) F ⊢ ∀xy[ x = y1 → ( x E γ0 →
∨
β∈[ε...γ0]
x = β ) ] .
as it follows from (1), (2), (3) and the axiom F11 that
F ⊢ ∀x[ x E γ0 →
∨
β∈[ε...γ0]
x = β ] .
Our induction hypothesis yields
F ⊢ ∀x[ x E γ →
∨
β∈[ε...γ]
x = β ] . (IH)
It is trivial that (1) holds. This is a logical truth that holds in any model. We
do not need any of our non-logical axioms to prove (1). Let us turn to the proof
of (2). We reason in an arbitrary model for F . Assume x = y0 and x E γ0. We
need to argue that
∨
β∈[ε...γ0]
x = β (†)
holds in the model. It is obvious that we have y0 E γ0. By F7, we have y E γ.
By (IH), we have ∨
β∈[ε...γ]
y = β .
Thus, we also have ∨
β∈[ε...γ]
y0 = β0
as y = β → y0 = β0. Furthermore, since x = y0 and β0 ≡ β0, we have
∨
β∈[ε...γ]
x = β0 . (‡)
Finally, we observe that (‡) implies (†). This proves (2).
The proof of (3) is symmetric to the proof of (2). Use the axiom F9 in place of
F7. This completes the proof for the case α ≡ γ0. The case α ≡ γ1 is symmetric.
Use the axioms F8 and F10, respectively, in place of F7 and F9. ⊓⊔
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Lemma 23. Let φ(x) be an LBT -formula such that
F |= φ(α) ⇒ F ⊢ φ(α) (*)
for any α ∈ {0,1}∗. Then we have
F |= (∀x E α)φ(x) ⇒ F ⊢ (∀x E α)φ(x)
for any α ∈ {0,1}∗.
Proof. Assume F |= (∀x E α)φ(x). Then, we have
F |=
∧
β∈[ε...α]
φ(β) .
By (*), we have
F ⊢
∧
β∈[ε...α]
φ(β) .
By Lemma 22, we have F ⊢ (∀x E α)φ(x). ⊓⊔
Theorem 24 (Σ-completeness of F ). For any Σ-sentence φ, we have
F |= φ ⇒ F ⊢ φ .
Proof. Given the lemmas above, we can more or less just repeat the proof of
Theorem 13. Use Lemma 20 in place of Lemma 10, Lemma 21 in place of Lemma
11 and Lemma 23 in place of Lemma 12. ⊓⊔
Both B and D are open theories (all the axioms are purely universal statements)
whereas F is not. The axiom F11 contains an existential quantifier. Can we find
a purely universal set of axioms that is Σ-complete with respect to the model
F? Yes, we can. We can regard Lemma 22 as an axiom scheme. Then we do not
need F11 to achieve Σ-completeness.
Definition 25. Let F ′ be the first-order theory F where the axiom F11 is re-
placed by the scheme
∀x[ x E α →
∨
β∈[ε...α]
x = β ] . (for α ∈ {0,1}∗)
Theorem 26 (Σ-completeness of F ′). For any Σ-sentence φ, we have
F |= φ ⇒ F ′ ⊢ φ .
Proof. Proceed as in the proof of Theorem 24. Since the axiom scheme is present,
F11 will not be needed anymore. ⊓⊔
Now, F ′ is an open theory, but in contrast to B and D, it is not finite.
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Conjecture: There is no finite open set of axioms that is Σ-complete with respect
to the structure F.
3 Normal Form Theorems
After we have endowed bit theory with bounded quantifiers, it becomes natural
to search for normal forms and see if we can prove normal form theorems similar
to the ones we know from number theory.
Some lemmas (27, 29, 30 ) in this section can be found elsewhere, e.g., in Bu¨chi
& Senger [1], Senger [21] and Karhuma¨ki et al. [12]. We have given complete
proofs below in order to make our paper self-contained (the proofs we give do
not differ essentially from those given in Bu¨chi & Senger [1]).
The next lemma shows that conjunctions of equations can be replaced by one
equation.
Lemma 27. Let s1, s2, t1, t2 be LBT -terms. We have
B− |= (s1 = t1 ∧ s2 = t2) ↔ s10s2s11s2 = t10t2t11t2 .
Proof. Let α1, α2, β1, β2 ∈ {0,1}
∗. Assume α10α2α11α2 = β10β2β11β2. Then
|α10α2| = |β10β2| and |α11 α2| = |β11α2|. The proof splits into the two cases
|α1| = |β1| and |α1| 6= |β1|. In the case when |α1| = |β1|, we obviously have α1 =
β1 and α2 = β2. Assume |α1| 6= |β1|. We can w.l.o.g. assume that |α1| < |β1|.
This implies that
0 = (α10α2)|α1|+1 = (t)|α1|+1 = (α11α2)|α1|+1 = 1 .
This is a contradiction. This proves the implication from the right to the left.
The converse implication is obvious. ⊓⊔
The next lemma shows that disjunctions of equations can be replaced by one
equation at the price of some more existential quantifiers.
Lemma 28. Let s1, s1, t1, t2 be LBT -terms. There exist LBT -terms s, t and vari-
ables v1, . . . , vk such that
D |= (s1  t1 ∨ s2  t2)↔ ∃v1 . . . vk[s = t] .
Proof. Let x1, . . . , x6 be variables that do not occur in any of the terms s1, s2, t1, t2.
It is not very hard to see that the formula s1  t1 ∨ s2  t2 is D-equivalent to
the formula
∃x1 . . . x6[ s1 = x1x2 ∧ t1 = x1x3 ∧
s2 = x4x5 ∧ t2 = x4x6 ∧ (x2 = e ∨ x5 = e) ] . (*)
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We will show that the disjunction in (*), that is x2 = e∨x5 = e, can be replaced
by a formula
x2x5 = x5x2 ∧ ∃y1 . . . y4[ v1 = v
′
1 ∧ v2 = v
′
2 ∧ v3 = v
′
3 ]
where v1, v2, v3, v
′
1, v
′
2, v
′
3 are terms. Thus, by Lemma 27 which allow us to merge
conjunctions of equations, (*) will be equivalent to a formula of the form
∃x1 . . . x6y1 . . . y4[ s = t ]
and our proof will be complete.
Let ψ(u,w) be the formula
∃y1y2y3y4[ y1y2 = 0 ∧ y3y4 = 1 ∧ uy1wy2 = wy2uy1
∧ uy3wy4 = wy4uy3 ] .
We claim that
B− |= (u = e ∨ w = e) ↔ (uw = wu ∧ ψ(u,w)) . (**)
We prove (**). Assume that u = e ∨ w = e (we reason in B−). Let us say that
u = e (the case when w = e is symmetric). It is obvious that we have uw = wu.
Moreover, ψ(u,w) holds with y1 = y3 = e, y2 = 0 and y4 = 1. This prove the
left-right implication of (**).
To see that the converse implication holds, assume that ¬(u = e ∨ w = e), that
is, both u and w are different from the empty string. Furthermore, assume that
uw = wu. We will argue that ψ(u,w) does not hold: Since uw = wu and both u
and w contain at least one bit, it is either the case that 0 is the last bit of both
strings, or it is that case that 1 is the last bit of both strings. If 0 is the last bit
of both, the two equations uy3wy4 = wy4uy3 and y3y4 = 1 cannot be satisfied
simultaneously. If 1 is the last bit of both, the two equations uy1wy2 = wy2uy1
and y1y2 = 0 cannot be satisfied simultaneously. Hence we conclude that ψ(u,w)
does not hold. This completes the proof of (**).
As explained above, our lemma follows from (*) and (**) by Lemma 27. ⊓⊔
Karhuma¨ki et al. [12] prove that the next lemma indeed holds with k = 2.
Lemma 29. Let s1, s2, t1, t2 be LBT -terms. There exist LBT -terms s, t and vari-
ables v1, . . . , vk such that
B− |= (s1 = t1 ∨ s2 = t2)↔ ∃v1 . . . vk[s = t] .
Proof. Observe that s1 = t1 ∨ s2 = t2 is D-equivalent to
(s1  t1 ∧ t1  s1) ∨ (s2  t2 ∧ t2  s2)
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which again is (logically) equivalent to
(s1  t1 ∨ s2  t2) ∧ (s1  t1 ∨ t2  s2) ∧
(t1  s1 ∨ s2  t2) ∧ (t1  s1 ∨ t2  s2) .
By Lemma 27 and Lemma 28, we have terms s, t and variables v1 . . . vk such
that
D |= (s1 = t1 ∨ s2 = t2)↔ ∃v1 . . . vk[s = t] .
Thus, the lemma holds as we are dealing with a L−BT -formula. ⊓⊔
Lemma 30. Let s1, t1 be LBT -terms. There exist LBT -terms s, t and variables
v1, . . . , vk such that
B− |= s1 6= t1 ↔ ∃v1 . . . vk[s = t] .
Proof. Observe that the formula s 6= t is B−-equivalent to the formula
∃xyz[ s = t0x ∨ s = t1x ∨ t = s0x ∨ t = s1x ∨
(s = x1y ∧ t = x0z) ∨ (s = x0y ∧ t = x1z) ] .
Thus, the lemma follows from Lemma 29 and Lemma 27. ⊓⊔
Lemma 31. Let s1, t1 be LBT -terms. There exist LBT -terms s, t and variables
v1, . . . , vk such that
D |= s1 6 t1 ↔ ∃v1 . . . vk[s = t] .
Proof. The formula s1 6 t1 is D-equivalent to the formula
( ∃u[t1u = s1] ∧ t1 6= s1 ) ∨ ∃xyz[ (t1 = x0y ∧ s1 = x1z) ∨
(t1 = x1y ∧ s1 = x0z) ] .
Thus, the lemma follows from the preceding lemmas. ⊓⊔
Theorem 32 (Normal Form Theorem for D). Any Σ-formula φ is D-
equivalent to a LBT -formula of the form
(Qt11 v1) . . . (Q
tm
m vm) s = t
where t1, .., tm are LBT -terms and Q
tj
j vj ∈ {∃vj , ∃vj  tj , ∀vj  tj} for j =
1, . . . ,m. Moreover, if φ is a purely existential formula, then Q
tj
j vj is ∃vj.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the structure of the Σ-formula φ (throughout
the proof we reason in the structure D). Assume φ ≡ s  t. Then φ is equivalent
to a formula of the form ∃x[sx = t] and the theorem holds. Assume φ ≡ s 6 t.
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Then the theorem holds by Lemma 31. Assume φ ≡ s 6= t. Then the theorem
holds by Lemma 30. The theorem holds trivially when φ is of the form s = t.
Suppose φ is of the form ψ ∧ ξ. By our induction hypothesis, we have formulas
(Qt11 x1) . . . (Q
tk
k xk) s1 = t1 and (Q
s1
1 y1) . . . (Q
sm
m ym) s2 = t2
which are equivalent to respectively ψ and ξ. Thus, φ is equivalent to a formula of
the form (Qt11 x1) . . . (Q
tk
k xk)(Q
s1
1 y1) . . . (Q
sm
m ym)(s1 = t1∧s2 = t2) . By Lemma
27, we have a formula of the desired form which is equivalent to φ. The case
when φ is of the form ψ ∨ ξ is similar. Use Lemma 29 in place of Lemma 27.
The theorem follows trivially from the induction hypothesis when φ is of one of
the forms (∃v)ψ, (∀v  t)ψ and (∃v  t)ψ.
If φ is a purely existential formula, there will be no bounded universal quantifiers
among (Qt11 v1) . . . (Q
tm
m vm). Thus, φ is equivalent to a formula of the form
∃v1 . . . vk[ s1  t1 ∧ . . . ∧ sℓ  tℓ ∧ s = t ]
which again is equivalent to a formula of the form
∃v1 . . . vkx1 . . . xℓ[ s1x1 = t1 ∧ . . . ∧ sℓxℓ = tℓ ∧ s = t ] .
By Lemma 27, we can conclude that any purely existential formula is equivalent
to a formula of the form ∃v1 . . . vm[s = t]. ⊓⊔
Theorem 33 (Normal Form Theorem for F). Any Σ-formula φ is F-equivalent
to a LBT -formula of the form
(∃v0)(Q1v1 E t1) . . . (Qmvm E tm) s = t
where Qj ∈ {∃, ∀} for j = 1, . . . ,m. Moreover, if φ is a purely existential for-
mula, then φ is equivalent to a formula of the form
∃v0 . . . vm[ v1 E t1 ∧ . . . ∧ vm E tm ∧ s = t ] .
Proof. We prove the theorem by induction on the structure of the Σ-formula φ
(throughout the proof we reason in the structure F). Assume φ ≡ s E t. Then
φ is equivalent to a formula of the form ∃x E t[x = s], and the theorem holds.
Assume φ ≡ s 6E t. Then φ is equivalent to t ◦ 0 E s, and thus also equivalent to
a formula of the form ∃x E s[x = t ◦ 0]. Hence the theorem holds. Furthermore,
the theorem holds by Lemma 30 when φ ≡ s 6= t, and the theorem holds trivially
when φ ≡ s = t.
The inductive cases φ ≡ ψ ∧ ξ and φ ≡ ψ ∨ ξ are similar to the corresponding
cases in the proof of Theorem 32 (normal form theorem for D).
The cases φ ≡ (∃x)ψ, φ ≡ (∃x E t)ψ and φ ≡ (∀x E t)ψ are are easy to deal
with. A formula of the form
– (∀x E t)(∃y)ψ is equivalent to a formula of the form (∃z)(∀x E t)(∃y E z)
18 Lars Kristiansen and Juvenal Murwanashyaka
– (∃x E t)(∃y)ψ is equivalent to a formula of the form (∃y)(∃x E t)ψ
– (∃x)(∃y)ψ is equivalent to a formula of the form (∃z)(∃x E z)(∃y E z)ψ.
Thus, any Σ-formula is F-equivalent to a Σ-formula that contains maximum one
unbounded existential quantifier.
If φ is a purely existential formula, then Q1, . . . ,Qm will all be existential quan-
tifiers. Thus, it is easy to see that any purely existential formula is equivalent to
a formula of the form
∃v0 . . . vm[ v1 E t1 ∧ . . . ∧ vm E tm ∧ s = t ] .
⊓⊔
It is not true that any purely existential formula is F-equivalent to a formula of
the form ∃x1 . . . xn[s = t]. This follows from the results in Karhuma¨ki et al. [12].
E.g., a formula like x E y ∧ y E x which states that the length of x equals the
length of y, is not F-equivalent to a formula of the form ∃x1 . . . xn[s = t]. See
Example 27 in Section 6 of [12].
Lemma 34. Let s1, t1 be LBT -terms. There exist LBT -terms s, t and variables
v1, . . . , vk such that
B |= s1 6⊑ t1 ↔ ∀v1 ⊑ t1∃v2 . . . vk[ s = t ] .
Proof. Observe that s1 6⊑ t1 is B-equivalent to (∀v ⊑ t1)α where α is
∃x[ t1x = vs1 ∧ x 6= e ] ∨ ∃xyz[ (t1 = x0y ∧ vs1 = x1z) ∨
(t1 = x1y ∧ vs1 = x0z) ] .
If we let vs1  t1 abbreviate ∃x[vs1x = t1], then α can be written as vs1 6 t1.
Thus, the lemma follows by Lemma 31. ⊓⊔
Theorem 35 (Normal Form Theorem for B). Any Σ-formula φ is B-
equivalent in to a LBT -formula of the form
(∃v0)(Q1v1 ⊑ t1) . . . (Qmvm ⊑ tm) s = t
where Qj ∈ {∃, ∀} for j = 1, . . . ,m.
Proof. Proceed by induction on the structure of the Σ-formula φ. This proof is
similar to the proof of Theorem 33 (normal form theorem for F). If φ is of form
s ⊑ t, then φ is B-equivalent a formula of the form ∃x1x2[x1sx2 = t]. If φ is of
the form s 6⊑ t, then then Lemma 34 says that φ is B-equivalent to a formula
of the form ∀v1 ⊑ t1∃v2 . . . vk[s = t]. The remaining cases of the inductive proof
are similar to their respective cases in the proof of Theorem 33. ⊓⊔
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We have not been able to find an interesting normal form for purely existential
formulas which is stronger than the one for Σ-formulas in B. It follows form the
results in Karhuma¨ki et al. [12] that the relation x 6⊑B y cannot be defined in the
structure B−: By Theorem 16 in [12], it is not possible to define the language
L = { α | α ∈ {0,1}∗ and 101 6⊑B α }
by a word equation. If we could define x 6⊑B y in B−, then it would have been
possible to define L by a word equation. We refer the reader to the paper itself
for further details as Theorem 16 is a rather involved statement.
Since it is not possible to define x 6⊑B y in B−, the normal form theorem
for purely existential formulas in D (Theorem 32), will for sure be false with
respect to B. So will the normal form theorem for purely existential formulas in
F (Theorem 33).
4 Decidability and Undecidability
4.1 Fragments
Let us start to track the border between the decidable and the undecidable.
On the one hand, we have Makanin’s result (Theorem 2). We know that it is
decidable if a sentence of the form ∃~x[s = t] holds in the standard model. We also
know that any purely existential formula is D-equivalent to formula of this form.
On the other hand it is not very hard to prove a stronger version of Theorem 1:
Theorem 36 (Σ-Definability of Computable Functions). For any (par-
tially) computable function f : Nn → N there exists a Σ-formula φ(x1, . . . , xn, y)
such that
f(a1, . . . , an) = b ⇔ D |= φ(1
a1 , . . . ,1an ,1b) .
Moreover, given a definition of the function, we can compute the formula.
With some effort, the interested reader should be able to accomplish a proof of
this theorem. The theorem implies that it is undecidable if a Σ-sentence holds in
D. It is easy to define the relations D and 6D by Σ-formulas in the structures
B and F, and the bounded quantifiers of D can be expressed by Σ-formulas in
in B and F, e.g., if
D |= φ ⇔ B |= φ′
then
D |= (∃x  t)φ ⇔ B |= (∃xy ⊑ t)[ xy = t ∧ φ′ ]
Thus Theorem 36 also implies that it undecidable if a Σ-sentence holds in B or
F.
In order to gain further insight into what we can—and cannot—decide in bit
theory, we need to keep track of the number and the type of quantifiers that
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appear in our Σ-formulas. We will say that a Σ-formula is a Σn,m,k-formula if it
contains n unbounded existential quantifiers, m bounded existential quantifiers
and k bounded universal quantifiers. The fragment ΣAn,m,k is the set of Σn,m,k-
sentences that are true in the LBT -structure A. The (purely existential) fragment
∃A is the set of purely existential sentences that are true in the LBT -structure
A (recall that a purely existential formula is a Σ-formula with no occurrences
of bounded universal quantifiers). A ∆-formula is a Σ-formula that contain no
unbounded existential quantifiers, and the fragment ∆A is the set of ∆-sentences
that are true in the LBT -structure A. Note that
∃A =
⋃
n,m∈N
ΣAn,m,0 and ∆
A =
⋃
m,k∈N
ΣA0,m,k .
4.2 Decidable Fragments
Theorem 37. The fragments ∆D, ∆B and ∆F are decidable.
Proof. We prove that ∆B is decidable. Let φ be a ∆-formula. The negation of
a ∆-formula is logically equivalent to a ∆-formula (use De Morgan’s laws). We
can compute a ∆-formula φ′ which is logically equivalent to ¬φ. By Theorem
13, we have B ⊢ φ if B |= φ. By the same theorem, we have B ⊢ φ′ if B |= ¬φ.
The set of formulas derivable from the axioms of B is computably enumerable.
Hence it is decidable if φ is true in B.
We can prove that the fragments ∆D and ∆F are decidable in the same way as
we also have Σ-complete axiomatizations for both D and F. ⊓⊔
In some sense, we kill a fly with a hammer when we use Σ-completeness to prove
the preceding theorem. It can of course be checked by brute-force algorithms if
∆-sentences are true in the structures D, B and F.
Theorem 38. The fragment ∃D is decidable.
Proof. Theorem 32 states that any purely existential formula φ is D-equivalent
to a formula of the normal form ∃v1 . . . vm[s = t]. Our proofs show that there is
an algorithm for transforming φ into this normal form. Thus the theorem follows
by Makanin’s result (Theorem 2). ⊓⊔
Open Problem: Is the fragment ∃B decidable?
Open Problem: Is the fragment ∃F decidable?
4.3 The Modulo Problem
In [13] we use the Post’s Correspondence Problem (Post [18]) to prove that
the fragments ΣD3,0,2, Σ
D
4,1,1, Σ
B
1,2,1 and Σ
B
1,0,2 are undecidable. We will improve
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these results considerably in the next section. In this section we introduce an
undecidable problem that is especially tailored for our needs in that respect, that
is, an undecidable problem that makes the proofs in next section smooth and
transparent. In lack of a better name, we dub the problem the Modulo Problem.
We assume that the reader is familiar with modulo arithmetic and elementary
number theory. We use fN to denote the N th iteration of an unary function f ,
that is, f0(X) = X and fN+1(x) = f(fN(x)).
Definition 39. The Modulo Problem is given by
– Instance: a list of pairs 〈A0, B0〉, . . . , 〈AM−1, BM−1〉 where M > 1 and
Ai, Bi ∈ N (for i = 0, . . . ,M − 1).
– Solution: a natural number N such that fN(3) = 2 where
f(x) = Ajz +Bj
if there exists j < M such that x = zM + j.
The undecidability of the Modulo Problem follows from the existence of a certain
type of Collatz functions constructed in Kurtz & Simon [14]. We will spend the
rest of this section to explain why the problem is undecidable.
We will work with the counter machines introduced by Minsky [17]. These ma-
chines are also known as register machines or Minsky machines. A counter ma-
chine consists of
– a finite number of registers X1, . . . Xn
– a finite number of instructions I1, . . . , Im.
The registers store natural numbers. The instructions tell the machine how to
manipulate these numbers. The machine starts by executing the instruction I2.
Each resister stores 0 when the execution starts (our counter machines do not
take input). The instruction I1 is the unique halting instruction. This instruction
does not modify any register, and the machine halts if and only if this instruction
is executed. Each of the the remaining instructions I2, . . . , Im will either be an
increment instruction or a decrement instruction. An increment instruction Ii is
of the form Ii : Xj , Ik. The instruction tells the machine to increment the natural
number stored in the register Xj by one and then proceed with instruction Ik.
A decrement instruction Ii is of the form Ii : Xj , Ik, Iℓ. The instruction tells the
machine to decrement the natural number stored in the register Xj by one if this
is possible, that is, if the number is strictly greater than zero. If it is possible to
decrement the number, the machine will proceed with instruction Ik; if it is not
possible, the machine will proceed with instruction Iℓ. We assume that we have
i 6= k in any increment instruction and i 6∈ {k, ℓ} in any decrement instruction
(this makes it easier to see that some of the arguments below indeed are correct).
It is well known that it is undecidable if a counter machine that starts with every
register set to zero will terminate with every register set to zero. Kurtz & Simon
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[14] simulate counter machines by FracTran programs. A FracTran program f
is a finite sequence q1, . . . , qs of non-negative rational numbers. The transition
function Ff for the FracTran program f maps the natural number x to qix where
i is the least i such that qix is integral. If no such i exists, we regard Ff (x) as
undefined.
Following Kurtz & Simon [14], we will show how we given a counter machine
M can construct a FracTran program fM such that there exists N such that
FNfM(3) = 2 iff M terminates with every register set to zero. Let pi denote the
ith prime (p1 = 2).
The execution of a counter machine can be viewed as a sequence of configurations
of the form
Ii, a1, a2, . . . , an
where Ii is the instruction to be executed next and a1, a2, . . . , an, respectively,
are the numbers stored in the registers X1, . . . Xn. We represent a configuration
by a natural number of the form
pip
a1
m+1p
a2
m+2 . . . p
an
m+n .
where i ≤ m. Let fM be a FracTran program q1, . . . , qs such that
(1) for each increment instruction Ii : Xj , Ik of M’s, there is t such that qt =
pkpm+j/pi
(2) for each decrement instruction Ii : Xj , Ik, Iℓ of M’s, there is t such that
qt = pk/pipm+j and qt+1 = pℓ/pi
(3) q1, . . . , qs is a minimal sequence that satisfies (1) and (2) (so no sequence of
length s− 1 will satisfy (1) and (2)).
Let us make some observations. Let Ii be the increment instruction Ii : Xj , Ik.
Then pkpm+j/pi is the one and only qt in the sequence q1, . . . , qs such that
qtpip
a1
m+1 . . . p
an
m+n is integral. Thus, we have
FfM(pip
a1
m+1 . . . p
aj
m+j . . . p
an
m+n) =
pkpm+j
pi
pip
a1
m+1 . . . p
aj
m+j . . . p
an
m+n
= pkp
a1
m+1 . . . p
aj+1
m+j . . . p
an
m+n.
Let Ii be the decrement instruction Ii : Xj , Ik, Iℓ and assume that Xj stores
aj > 0. Now there are exactly two rationals r in the sequence q1, . . . , qs such
that rpip
a1
m+1 . . . p
an
m+n is integral. These two rationals are pk/pipm+j and pℓ/pi.
Since pk/pipm+j occur before pℓ/pi, we have
FfM(pip
a1
m+1 . . . p
aj
m+j . . . p
an
m+n) =
pk
pipm+j
pip
a1
m+1 . . . p
aj
m+j . . . p
an
m+n
= pkp
a1
m+1 . . . p
aj−1
m+j . . . p
an
m+n .
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If Ii is the decrement instruction Ii : Xj , Ik, Iℓ and Xj stores 0, then pℓ/pi is the
only qt in the sequence that makes qtpip
a1
m+1 . . . p
an
m+n integral, and we have
FfM(pip
a1
m+1 . . . p
an
m+n) = pℓp
a1
m+1 . . . p
an
m+n .
Any counter machine starts in the configuration I2, 0, 0, . . . , 0 (our counter ma-
chines do not take input and every register stores zero when the execution starts).
This start configuration is represented by the prime p2, that is, 3. If a counter ma-
chine halts with every register set to 0, it halts in the configuration I1, 0, 0, . . . , 0.
This configuration is represented by the prime p1, that is, 2. Given the observa-
tions above, it should be obvious that there exists N such that FNfM(3) = 2 iff
M halts with every register set to 0. Thus, we conclude that it is undecidable if
there exists N such that FNfM(3) = 2.
A Collatz function is a function C : N→ N that can be written of the form
C(x) = aix+ bi if x ≡ i mod M
where ai, bi ∈ Q and M ∈ N (for more on Collatz functions and the related
Collatz problem, see [14]). Following the ideas of Kurtz & Simon [14], we will
now construct a Collatz function CM of the more restricted form
CM(x) = aix if x ≡ i mod M .
such that we have CM(x) = FfM(x) whenever FfM(x) is defined. We use the
FracTran program fM = q1, . . . , qs to determine M and a0, a1, . . . , aM−1.
For each qi in the FracTran program fM = q1, . . . , qs, let ci, di ∈ N be such that
ci/di = qi and ci and di are relatively prime. SetM to the least common multiple
of d1, . . . , ds and then follow the procedure (I) to determine a0, a1, . . . , aM−1.
When the procedure starts every aj is undefined.
PROCEDURE (I):
for i := 1, . . . , s do
for j := 0, . . . ,M − 1 do
aj :=


aj if aj already is defined
qi if aj is not yet defined and di divides j
undefined otherwise.
This completes the construction of CM. Many of the rationals a0, a1, . . . , aM−1
might still not be defined when the procedure terminates, but that is not impor-
tant to us. The following claim is what matters to us:
FfM(x) = qix ⇔ CM(x) = qix . (claim)
In order to see that our claim holds, assume that FfM(x) = qix. Then, we know
that qix ∈ N and that qℓx 6∈ N when ℓ < i. Let x = zM + j where j < M and
let ci/di = qi where ci and di are relatively prime. Then, we have
qix =
ci
di
(zM + j) ∈ N .
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As di divides M but not ci, it must be the case that di divides j. A symmetric
argument yields that dℓ does not divide j when ℓ < i. Thus, our procedure sets
aj to qi. Hence, we have CM(x) = CM(zM + j) = ajx = qix. This proves
that the left-right implication of the claim holds. It is easy to see that also the
right-left implication holds.
It follows from the claim that FNfM(3) = 2 iff C
N
M(3) = 2. Thus, we conclude
that it is undecidable if there exists N such that CNM(3) = 2 (since we already
have concluded that it is undecidable if there exists N such that FNfM(3) = 2).
We are soon ready to conclude that the Modulo Problem is undecidable. The
function f in the Modulo Problem is a total function. Now, CM is by no means
a total function, but if CM(x) is defined and x = zM + j where j < M , then it
turns out that we have Aj , Bj ∈ N such that CM(x) = Ajz + Bj . To see that
such Aj and Bj exist, observe that
CM(zM + j) =
c
d
(zM + j) ∈ N
for some relatively prime natural numbers c and d. Moreover, the algorithm for
constructing CM assures that d divides both M and j. Hence, let Aj = cM/d
and let Bj = cj/d, and Aj and Bj will be natural numbers such that CM(x) =
Ajz + Bj . This entails that the following procedure will construct a sequence
〈A0, B0〉, . . . 〈AM−1, BM−1〉 of pair of natural numbers:
PROCEDURE (II):
for j := 0, . . . ,M − 1 do
– set Aj = cM/d and Bj = cj/d if procedure (I) defines aj to equal c/d
– set Aj = Bj = 0 if procedure (I) leaves aj undefined.
Now, let
f(x) = Ajz +Bj
if there exists j < M such that x = zM + j. Then, we obviously have f(x) =
CM(x) whenever CM(x) is defined. Thus, as it is undecidable if there exists
N such that CNM(3) = 2, it is also undecidable if there exists N such that
fN (3) = 2. These considerations should make it clear that the Modulo Problem
is undecidable.
4.4 Undecidable Fragments
The stage is now set for our undecidability results. We know that the Modulo
Problem is undecidable. Let 〈A0, B0〉, . . . , 〈AM−1, BM−1〉 be an instance of the
problem, and let
f(x) = Ajz +Bj
if there exists j < M such that x = zM + j. It is easy to see that there is N
such that fN (3) = 2 if and only if there exists a bit string of the form
01a0+101a1+10 . . .01aN+10 (*)
where
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– a0 = 3 and aN = 2
– for each i ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1} there is z ∈ N and j < M such that
ai = zM + j and ai+1 = Ajz +Bj .
The challenge is to claim the existence of a bit string x of the form (*) by using
as few quantifiers as possible. We will of course need one unbounded existential
quantifier to claim the existence of x. Then we will need some quantifiers to state
that x is of the desired form. In the structure D, we will state that any prefix of
x of the form y01 can be extended to a prefix of x of the form
y01111 . . .111︸ ︷︷ ︸
kM copies
111 . . .111︸ ︷︷ ︸
j copies
01111 . . .111︸ ︷︷ ︸
kAj copies
111 . . .111︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bj copies
0 (**)
for some j and k. Recall that j, M , Aj , Bj are fixed natural numbers. Thus, for
each j ∈ {0, . . . ,M − 1}, we can express that x has a prefix of the form (**) by
a formula ∃z[ψj(x, y, z)] where
ψj(x, y, z) ≡ z1 = 1z ∧ y01 zz . . . zz︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
11 . . .11︸ ︷︷ ︸
j
01 zz . . . zz︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aj
11 . . . 11︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bj
0  x .
In addition we have to state that x should start with 011110 and end with
01110. This explains why the formula
(∃x)
[
011110  x ∧ (∀y  x)
[
y01 6 x ∨ y01110 = x
∨ (∃z)[
M−1∨
j=0
ψj(x, y, z) ]
] ]
claims the existence of a bit string of the form (*). The formula contains two
unbounded existential quantifiers and one bounded universal quantifier. If we
could decide if such a formula is true in D, then we could decide the Modulo
Problem. Hence, ΣD2,0,1 is an undecidable fragment.
Similar reasoning will show that the fragments ΣB1,0,1 and Σ
F
1,3,2 are undecidable.
The details can be found below.
Theorem 40. The fragments ΣD2,0,1, Σ
B
1,0,1 and Σ
F
1,3,2 are undecidable.
Proof. For any LBT -term t let [t]
0 ≡ e and let [t]n+1 ≡ t ◦ [t]n. Furthermore,
note that the word equation x1 = 1x is satisfied iff x ∈ {1}∗.
Let 〈A0, B0〉, . . . , 〈AM−1, BM−1〉 be an instance of the Modulo Problem.
First we prove that ΣD2,0,1 is undecidable. For i ∈ {0, . . . ,M − 1}, let
ψj(x, y, z) ≡ z1 = 1z ∧ y01[z]
M [1]j01[z]Aj [1]Bj0  x .
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and let φ be the Σ2,0,1-formula
(∃x)
[
01[1]30  x ∧ (∀y  x)
[
y01 6 x ∨ y01[1]20 = x
∨ (∃z)[
M−1∨
j=0
ψj(x, y, z) ]
] ]
Then D |= φ if and only if the instance has a solution. Obviously, there is an
algorithm for constructing φ when the instance is given, and thus no algorithm
can decide if a Σ2,0,1-sentence is true in D, that is, the fragment Σ
D
2,0,1 is unde-
cidable.
Next we prove that ΣB1,0,1 is undecidable. For j ∈ {0, . . . ,M − 1}, let ξj(y, x) be
the formula
(
y1 = 1y ∧ 01[y]M [1]j0 ⊑ x ∧ [y]M [1]j 6= [1]2
)
→
01[y]M [1]j01[y]Aj [1]Bj0 ⊑ x .
Note that ξj(y, x) is trivially equivalent to a Σ0,0,0-formula ξˆj(y, x). Let φ
′ be
the Σ1,0,1-formula
(∃x)
[
01[1]30 ⊑ x ∧ (∀y ⊑ x)[
M−1∨
j=0
ξˆj(y, x) ]
]
.
Then B |= φ′ if and only if the instance has a solution. There is an algorithm
for constructing φ′ from the instance, and thus we conclude that ΣB1,0,1 is unde-
cidable.
We are left to prove that ΣF1,3,2 is undecidable. The following formula does to
job:
(∃x)
[
(∃v E x)[ 01[1]30v = x ] ∧ (∀uv E x)
[
u01v 6= x ∨
u01[1]20 = x ∨ (∃zy E x)[
M−1∨
j=0
ηj(z, u, y, x) ]
] ]
where
ηj(z, u, y, x) ≡ z1 = 1z ∧ u01[z]
M [1]j01[z]Aj [1]Bj0y = x
for j ∈ {0, . . . ,M − 1}. ⊓⊔
Corollary 41. (i) It is undecidable whether a sentence of the form
(∃x1)(∀y  x1)(∃x2) . . . (∃xn) s = t
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is true in D. (ii) It is undecidable whether a sentence of the form
(∃x1)(∀y1y2 ⊑ x1)(∃x2) . . . (∃xn) s = t
is true in B. (iii) It is undecidable whether a sentence of the form
(∃x1)(∀y1y2 E x1)(∃x2) . . . (∃xn) s = t
is true in F.
Proof. Consider the Σ2,0,1-sentence φ if the proof of the preceding theorem. By
Theorem 32, φ is D-equivalent to sentence of the form
(∃x1)(∀y  x1)(∃x2) . . . (∃xn) s = t .
This proves that (i) holds. Furthermore, we have
D |= (∃x1)(∀y  x1)(∃x2) . . . (∃xn) s = t
if and only if
B |= (∃x1)(∀y1y2 ⊑ x1)(∃x2) . . . (∃xn)[ y1 ◦ y2 6= x1 ∨ s = t ]
if and only if
F |= (∃x1)(∀y1y2 E x1)(∃x2) . . . (∃xn)[ y1 ◦ y2 6= x1 ∨ s = t ] .
Thus, (ii) and (iii) hold by Lemma 29 and Lemma 30. ⊓⊔
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